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Abstract 
 There are few examples of an extended adversarial collaboration, in which investigators 
committed to different theoretical views collaborate to test opposing predictions. Whereas 
previous adversarial collaborations have produced single research articles, here we share our 
experience in programmatic, extended adversarial collaboration involving three laboratories in 
different countries with different theoretical views regarding working memory, the limited 
information retained in mind, serving ongoing thought and action. We have focused on short-
term memory retention of items (letters) during a distracting task (arithmetic), and effects of 
aging on these tasks. Over several years, we have conducted and published joint research with 
preregistered predictions, methods, and analysis plans, with replication of each study across two 
laboratories concurrently. We argue that, although an adversarial collaboration will not usually 
induce senior researchers to abandon favored theoretical views and adopt opposing views, it will 
necessitate varieties of their views that are more similar to one another, in that they must account 
for a growing, common corpus of evidence. This approach promotes understanding of others’ 
views and presents to the field research findings accepted as valid by researchers with opposing 
interpretations. We illustrate this process with our own research experiences and make 
recommendations applicable to diverse scientific areas.  
  
 
  
Adversarial Collaboration, Page 4 
 
How Do Scientific Views Change? 
Notes from an Extended Adversarial Collaboration 
 
In the hypothetico-deductive method long considered by many philosophers and scientists to 
be a key to scientific progress (Popper, 1935/1959; 1963), a hypothesis or expectation is tested 
and, if the outcomes of experiments do not support it, the hypothesis is abandoned and other 
hypotheses are devised for future testing. Other philosophers, however (especially Lakatos, 
1968-1969, 1978) have noted that scientific theories contain many interrelated hypotheses, which 
can lend a theory multiple ways to explain any one result. Most research in the field of 
experimental psychology still seems to follow the hypothetico-deductive method. Although we 
recognize its importance we think it is not enough to reconcile conflicting theoretical views, and 
we argue that the assessment of broad theories can occur more effectively if proponents of 
competing views work together in a sometimes tense but productive joint effort that has been 
termed an adversarial collaboration, whether or not each participant adheres to the hypothetico-
deductive method. In this effort, different participating groups work together to collect data 
jointly, but openly expect (and often hope for) different results. We convey our thoughts about 
this prospect based on a three-way adversarial collaboration, the longest-lasting one we have 
encountered, which focuses on theories of working memory in young adults and in cognitive 
aging. Working memory is the small amount of information that can be temporarily maintained 
in a readily accessible state and used in tasks such as problem-solving and language 
comprehension. It is essentially the information held in mind at a particular time, required for the 
current tasks, and updated moment to moment.  
To explain why adversarial collaborations can help, consider that each theoretical 
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framework is based on shared formative experiences and assumptions among a group of 
scientists, and the shared assumptions within each group affect the interpretation of scientific 
results (Kuhn, 1962). Alternative interpretations can result in contrasting theories with 
entrenched positions, without necessarily advancing understanding. Kuhn (p. 148) remarked, 
“The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-purposes. Neither 
side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other needs in order to make its case. 
...they are bound partly to talk through each other. Though each may hope to convert the other to 
his way of seeing his science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case.” We submit 
that the same is true for proponents of different theories of a body of findings. Consequently, we 
argue, an adversarial collaboration is beneficial whether one theory is more apt and another, less 
apt or whether there is substantial value in more than one theory; and it is beneficial whether 
someone is willing to abandon a theory, nobody is, or some new theory emerges that 
incorporates elements of each. We have found that it results in useful theory modifications. 
This issue of competing views is compounded by the use of different methodologies by 
proponents of different theoretical frameworks, and sometimes use of the same terms to refer to 
slightly different concepts, or different terms to refer to very similar concepts (Broadbent, 1984, 
pp. 86-91; Cowan, 2017). Rarely do individuals or groups with contrasting views collaborate 
directly using common methods. When such adversarial collaborations arise, they tend to be 
short-term, culminating in single research articles (e.g., Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001). 
The results typically can still be accommodated by both of the opposing theoretical views that 
motivated the research, in which case an extended collaboration could have been helpful. 
To compare two or more theoretical frameworks, the effort must be sustained. Most 
theoretical frameworks are not houses of cards that easily collapse by pulling out a single card 
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(or disconfirming a single hypothesis). For a specific hypothesis, it is plausible that data from a 
crucial experiment can determine whether one’s view remains tenable or can be falsified using 
the hypothetico-deductive method. This method is a positivist concept, meaning it comes from 
sensory input interpreted through reason and logic (Popper, 1935/1959, 1977). However, a single 
crucial experiment is unlikely to change a theoretical view that incorporates a broad web of 
hypotheses (cf. Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1968-1969; Newell, 1973).  
Nor can different theoretical views be compared simply by determining if one view is more 
parsimonious (simpler) than the other. Of course, it is the case that in deciding among competing 
theoretical explanations of a phenomenon, one guideline is to use Ockham’s Razor (Sober, 2015. 
That is the notion that the preferred explanation is the one that requires the fewest explanatory 
principles. In practice, though, this notion often cannot be used to adjudicate which of two views 
is simpler (i.e., more parsimonious) because the range of relevant phenomena is in question and 
because, to some extent, parsimony is in the eye of the beholder. For example, pertaining to our 
own project that we will describe, is it most parsimonious to postulate two separate modules 
(self-contained systems) in the brain for visual and verbal working memory, respectively, even if 
these modules appear to operate according to some similar rules?  Or, alternatively, is it more 
parsimonious to postulate a single, general mechanism that holds information regardless of its 
visual or verbal nature, such as the focus of attention, even though that mechanism has to be 
more sophisticated if it is to operate across materials like that? The notion of parsimony alone 
cannot resolve that sort of dilemma because researchers differ on which account of working 
memory they find most parsimonious. 
To address the field’s need to find ways to resolve differences in theoretical viewpoints, we 
first provide an orientation to the relevant scientific principles, followed by a brief, recent history 
Adversarial Collaboration, Page 7 
 
of adversarial collaborations and their limits. Then we describe an extended adversarial 
collaboration we have carried out among our three research groups. With our experiences in 
mind, we elaborate further the scientific principles and reach some recommendations for future 
collaborations. 
Potential Outcomes of Adversarial Collaborations 
One outcome of an adversarial collaboration is to change theories to become more accurate 
by presenting critically important data to be accounted for. Changes of a theory to accommodate 
new data can be either useful, if the changes are principled, or counterproductive, if the changes 
are makeshift and awkward for the theory. We believe, though, that adversarial collaboration is 
helpful in either case, in different ways.  
To elaborate on what can happen when scientific theories need to change, Lakatos (1968-
1969) distinguished between theoretically progressive and degenerative theory-testing paths. In 
the progressive path, the data lead to modified versions of theories that remain useful in 
accounting for a body of evidence, including the new evidence. In the degenerative path, the data 
lead to modified versions that are increasingly awkward and improbable, with new auxiliary 
assumptions added only to protect core assumptions of the theory from falsification. The 
desirable path, of course, is the progressive one. In practice, each theorist may think that their 
own path is the progressive one and that some alternative theorists are taking a degenerative 
path. This can occur, for example, if the theorists do not consider all of the same evidence to be 
valid, important, and sufficiently general or applicable across situations. In the long run, 
however, an extended adversarial collaboration may help to overcome this problem of how we 
perceive one another’s theories by increasing each investigator’s understanding of the opposing 
views and, ultimately, by presenting the collaborative group’s progress to the world for the 
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judgment of other scientists.   
Scientists observing the adversarial collaboration may encounter several alternative possible 
situations. Perhaps one of the theories clearly fits the evidence, whereas the others clearly do not; 
in practice, though, we believe that this outcome rarely occurs, at least in a complex field such as 
psychology. The reason is that alternative theories are often flexible enough that a theorist can 
propose plausible alternative versions of a theory to accommodate new evidence. Alternatively, 
multiple theories can fit the evidence and, hopefully, researchers can envision a way to resolve 
the theoretical ambiguity in follow-up research. The theories might evolve in a way that points 
toward some intermediate theoretical solution that includes some elements of more than one of 
the original theories. Perhaps some theories can evolve with the evidence on a progressive path, 
whereas other theories are on a degenerative path and should be abandoned. Even if theorists 
within the collaboration continue to disagree, the products of the collaboration do, we believe, 
help to indicate to the field what the true situation is, inasmuch as the opposing views are now 
applied to a common data set emerging from agreed-upon methods. 
Having articulated the general aim of adversarial collaborations, we now illustrate the merits 
and pitfalls of such collaborations in practice by assessing actual cases that have already 
occurred, including our extended, three-way collaboration. The lessons learned can steer future 
collaborations. What has gone right and what has gone wrong in our collaboration, and what 
guidelines might we provide? 
Prior Adversarial Collaborations and their Limits 
It seems likely that if two investigators have different worldviews that lead to different 
predictions for a particular kind of experiment, they may be naturally motivated to design the 
experiment in different ways. Each investigator would expect to obtain confirming evidence; the 
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important decision to design experiments to collect potentially disconfirming evidence is less 
pleasant and may often be avoided. Designing one’s experiment in a manner that makes it too 
favorable to one’s own theory can be unintentional and can occur because humans, including 
scientists, are affected by considerable confirmation bias in which they seek to verify rather than 
disprove their own ideas (e.g., Lilienfeld, 2010; Nickerson, 1998; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 
2013). Believers and disbelievers in a particular phenomenon thus may have a history of testing 
it in different ways, with subtle methodological differences that are more important than one or 
both camps realize.  
One way to overcome this issue of entrenched approaches is for investigators who disagree 
strongly on theory to work together to agree upon a method, and carry out the experiment(s) 
jointly. In one early example, the editor of Psychological Science, John Kihlstrom, reacted to a 
commentary by Michel Treisman on work by Cowan, Wood, and Borne (1994) on evidence for 
the existence of short-term memory (a small amount information saved temporarily in a manner 
separate from the vast amount of information in long-term memory). The editor suggested that 
he would publish a new empirical study in which the researchers worked together to resolve their 
differences. After they conducted and analyzed their agreed-upon experiments, though, they still 
could not agree on how to interpret the results, and Kihlstrom suggested splitting the discussion 
section. Cowan decided, however, that the available space for discussion was too short to be split 
effectively. Instead, the authors compromised on what to say in the resulting collaborative article 
(Cowan, Wood, Nugent, & Treisman, 1997). The reward of a prestigious publication made 
compromise easier.  
Mellers et al. (2001) carried out perhaps the first adversarial collaboration under that rubric, 
with research on seemingly illogical judgments. For example, the statement Linda is a bank 
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teller and is active in the feminist movement is often judged by participants to be more probable 
than the statement Linda is a bank teller, though that is logically impossible because a subset 
(bank tellers who are active in the feminist movement) cannot be more frequent then a more 
general set containing it (bank tellers regardless of other traits). The researchers set ground rules 
in which each side of the debate (represented by Hertwig versus Kahneman) was allowed to 
design one follow-up experiment, so a total of 3 experiments were conducted. In the end, the 
investigators still did not agree on the interpretation. Instead, they described what they did agree 
upon, followed by separate discussion sections with different interpretations by Hertwig and 
Kahneman. Essentially, Hertwig thought that participants tend to interpret the sentences 
linguistically in a way different from what was intended, whereas Kahneman thought that 
participants tend to make fundamental logical errors. Together they concluded (p. 275) that “Our 
joint efforts demonstrate the benefits of adversarial collaboration as a method for conducting 
scientific controversy. The major benefit is that both parties are likely to recognize limitations of 
their claims.” We see it as a special virtue that ground rules were set for the collaboration, but it 
seems a shame that these ground rules also tended to terminate the collaboration. A good 
compromise might be the 3-experiment rule for one article (at least, unless and until reviewers 
request additional experiments), fairness and symmetry in the plans if they have to be modified, 
and plans to continue working in this mode for additional articles.  
Matzke et al. (2015) carried out an adversarial collaboration on the effect of horizontal eye 
movements on free recall (recalling items that had been presented in a list, with the words 
recalled in any order that the participant wishes). This work involved preregistration of methods 
and expectations: listing these experimental details online with a time stamp that cannot later be 
altered, to help ensure that the investigators’ memory or expression of their predictions could not 
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change with the benefit of hindsight after the data were collected and analyzed. Changing one’s 
views after seeing the data is potentially a very constructive process in building theories, 
provided that an a posteriori account is not mistaken for an a priori prediction in support of a 
particular theory. In this case the investigators agreed that horizontal eye movements did not 
affect free recall in the study, which some of them had expected. Still, the investigators disagreed 
on the general outcome to be expected with future variations in the methods. The main 
methodological advance in that study may be the concurrent preregistration of not only the 
method, but also conflicting expectations. We hope that the collaboration continues. 
Oberauer et al. (2018) carried out a joint effort to identify phenomena that are well-
established in the area of working memory in order to make the statement that any fully adequate 
theory of working memory must account for these phenomena. This effort should be considered 
an adversarial collaboration inasmuch as the many participating authors held very different 
theoretical orientations, carried out two successive conference meetings to discuss the rules for 
inclusion versus exclusion of phenomena, and reached a general agreement. In this case, the 
issue of different theories was circumvented by trying not to discuss theories per se; there was 
more agreement on how to identify replicable phenomena than there was on how to arrive at the 
correct theory. It seems laudable to break down a tough problem (how to agree) into an easier 
part to be attacked first (agreement on phenomena to be included) while omitting a harder part to 
be attacked at some future point (agreement on theory). Even the statuses of the phenomena 
identified in the article and omitted from it, however, are not universally accepted (e.g., Logie, 
2018; Vandierendonck, 2018).  
Our Extended Adversarial Collaboration on Working Memory 
Overview 
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Our own adversarial collaboration arose from an attempt to resolve apparent empirical 
discrepancies between laboratories studying working memory. To do so, Logie, Camos, and 
Barrouillet settled on the idea of requesting grant funding to work together to resolve the issue. 
Cowan was added to the collaboration as he had another relevant theory and was already 
working with Logie on several related projects despite holding different views: a special journal 
issue on working memory introduced by Logie & Cowan (2015), and a dissertation committee 
resulting in joint publications (Rhodes, Cowan, Hardman, & Logie, 2018; Rhodes, Cowan, Parra, 
& Logie, 2019; Rhodes, Parra, Cowan, & Logie, 2017). Naveh-Benjamin, who has worked with 
Cowan on working memory and aging (e.g., Cowan, Naveh-Benjamin, Kilb, & Saults, 2006; 
Gilchrist, Cowan, & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2014), was included on the 
grant proposal to help us enrich our comparison of the theories via research on cognitive aging.  
We will first describe our collaboration in enough detail to convey a feeling for what it is 
like to work in a collaboration of this sort. The purpose of presenting it is to allow readers to 
understand the features of collaboration that, we believe, have made it work well. We summarize 
these features in Table 1 and recommend that other investigators planning adversarial 
collaborations adhere to as many of these points as possible. With some careful soul-searching, 
at the end of our description we also try to identify potential shortcomings of our collaboration 
that might be improved upon in the future.  
----- Place Table 1 Here ----- 
Process of Collaboration and Basic Method 
In our own collaboration, each of three groups favors a different theoretical view of working 
memory. Many investigators have long felt that, to get a comprehensive measure of a person’s 
working memory, one should combine items to be remembered with problems to be solved, 
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termed processing episodes (e.g., Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Conway et al., 2005; 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). The reason is that this method engages both storage of items in 
memory and other mental activities known as processing, in order to indicate what the 
participant is able to remember while also doing mental work concurrently. Processing episodes 
leave information in a different form than that in which it had been originally encountered; 
depending on the assigned task, letters that had been presented in random order might be 
repeated by the participant in alphabetical order, presented numbers might be added together, 
sentences might be comprehended, and so forth. A procedure with processing episodes between 
items to be remembered is often called a complex working memory span task.  
Here we use a simpler arrangement that we term a storage-then-processing task, in which all 
of the items in a list to be remembered on a trial are presented, followed by episodes of a 
separate processing task, and then by recall of the items in the list (first used by Brown, 1958 and 
Peterson & Peterson, 1959). We use this task in order to create a situation in which we can 
observe the effects of memory on processing and vice versa (dual-task costs) without requiring 
multiple switching between the two tasks in order to take in all of the materials.  
The basic reason to examine dual-task costs is that the multicomponent theory (e.g., Logie, 
1995, 2016) predicts that these costs should disappear when the tasks are adjusted to match the 
participant’s ability level, whereas the other two theories (e.g., Cowan, 1988, 2019; Barrouillet & 
Camos, 2015, in press) predict that the costs should remain under those conditions. After 
explaining the tasks more fully, we will explain the theories in relation to these tasks more fully. 
In the storage-then-processing task that we have used (Doherty et al., 2019; Rhodes et al., 
2019), letters are presented on a computer screen, or are spoken, one at a time, with simple 
arithmetic problems on the screen during a 10-second period following the last letter. After the 
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period of arithmetic problems has ended, the letters are to be recalled. On a particular trial with 
three letters for the sake of illustration, with two slashes (//) indicating a new computer screen 
display, a trial might look like this: X // B // Q // 5+7=11? //  4+5=9? // 3+5=7? // 3+6=9? // 
2+8=12? // 4+7=13? // Recall the letters. Correct answers to the arithmetic questions (no, yes, 
no, yes, no, no) are to be made on a button box quickly as the problems appear on the screen, and 
then, after the instruction to recall, the memory answer (X, B, Q) is to be made on the keyboard 
or is spoken aloud, depending on the experiment. Both letter memory and arithmetic are scored 
for correctness.  
Theoretical predictions for the multicomponent approach depended critically on the 
performance level. To stabilize it, initially the number of letters in the list and the number of 
arithmetic problems in 10 seconds are both separately adjusted for each participant to achieve an 
estimated 80% correct, and these levels of difficulty are used in separate and combined tasks. 
Although the embedded-processes and time-based resource sharing approaches did not require 
this kind of adjustment, proponents of all three approaches agreed that it was a useful refinement 
of the method emerging from the collaboration.   
Our focus has been on whether very different tasks, such as letter memory and arithmetic, 
still share some mental resource that must be split between them compared to when only one task 
is required, memory or arithmetic. If the tasks share a common resource under these conditions, 
then the storage-then-processing task should result in poorer memory for the letters and less 
accurate arithmetic responses compared to when the memory task is presented alone or the 
processing task is presented alone. 
Our collaboration is unusual in coordinating the efforts of three laboratories with different 
theories and predictions. Through this type of collaboration, we have made progress by obtaining 
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results using mutually-agreed-upon methods. The predictions and methods are preregistered for 
most experiments and each finding is examined in parallel in two of the three laboratories. Our 
experience in this collaboration indicates that, under these circumstances, differences between 
theoretical views have not been eradicated and, indeed, remain rather entrenched. Nevertheless, 
we advocate extended adversarial collaboration as a path toward scientific progress because 
details of each theoretical view tend to shift gradually in response to the data. The new, jointly-
collected data push on the theoretical accounts. Provided that the theorists trust these new data, 
which we happily have found to be the case, the views must be constrained so as to be capable of 
accounting for the new evidence. The resulting changes to the theories can create areas of new 
overlap between the different theories. 
Three Views in Competition, Illustrating the Need for an Adversarial Collaboration 
It is clear that there are important limits on how much information one can keep in mind, 
and that such limits importantly influence the quality of comprehension and problem-solving 
(e.g., Cowan, 2001). Different groups have traditionally proposed different fundamental causes 
of the limit in working memory. The theories make different predictions as to what should be 
expected in storage-then-processing tasks like the one described above. In addition to contrasting 
our predictions for this kind of task in young adults (Doherty et al., 2019), we also applied the 
theories to changes in storage-then-processing performance with adult aging (Rhodes et al., 
2019).  
The multicomponent theory. The key feature of a multicomponent theory is that, within 
working memory, information about speech sounds (whether derived from actual speech or from 
printed language), termed phonological information, is temporarily stored in one brain module 
(or mental process), whereas visual and spatial nonverbal information is temporarily stored in 
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another brain or mental process. These modules have been termed the phonological store and the 
visuospatial sketch pad, respectively (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999). The latter 
has been subdivided into more specialized mechanisms for storage of static visual material 
versus movements or pathways (Logie, 1995, 2016). 
In the first extended account of such a theory (started by Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
completed by Baddeley, 1986), there was also a system called the central executive, for making 
decisions about how and when stimuli that have been perceived are entered into one or the other 
kind of storage (or both kinds at once), or when or how the information is altered or recalled. It 
could be altered, for example, if the task were to recall letters not in the presented order but in 
alphabetical order. The present multicomponent theory differs from the classical ones in that it is 
assumed that the central executive is the name for multiple specialized systems that comprise a 
set of different mental tools that can operate in an integrated way in the healthy brain to support 
task performance, and can be impaired selectively following focal brain damage, but have not yet 
all been clearly identified on the basis of research (e.g., Logie, 2016; Logie, Belletier, & 
Doherty, in press). The other two theories (described below) also refer to executive processes, 
with less confidence that the field has enough knowledge to say whether it is composed of 
closely related or separate components. 
The time-based resource sharing theory. According to a second theory, the time-based 
resource sharing theory (e.g., Barrouillet & Camos, 2015, in press), information in working 
memory has to be maintained, lest it be lost as a function of the elapsed time; that is, it decays. 
There are two ways by which this maintenance occurs: by covert verbal recitation, or rehearsal, 
and by using attention to keep items active, a process termed refreshing. Then the persistence of 
an item in working memory hangs in the balance; if it decays to a certain low point, the 
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representation of the item in working memory can no longer be revived, and will not be recalled, 
on that trial; thus, the speeds of rehearsal and refreshing matter, and when they are used matters. 
The embedded-processes theory. The third theory includes the notion that there is a way to 
hold a limited amount of currently important information in working memory by paying 
attention to it. One expression of this view was provided by William James (1890) in his 
description of primary memory, the trailing edge of the present moment in consciousness. The 
embedded processes view accepts the idea of a primary memory, in particular limited to 
retaining about 3 independent items or thoughts in the typical adult, held in the focus of attention 
(Cowan, 1988, 2001, 2019).  
This view is termed “embedded” because the focus of attention does not act alone; it is a 
subset of a larger set of information that surrounds it, consisting of unorganized features of 
experience (colors, line orientations, sounds, tastes, meanings, and so on) that have become 
activated, or especially accessible to attention, through recent experiences and associations to 
those experiences. Activation lasts until these features decay beyond a point of no return (as in 
the time-based resource sharing theory) or until other, similar features of more recent stimuli 
cause too much interference when they are perceived. For example, a printed word might have 
orthographic activated features indicating how it looks in print, along with phonological features 
indicating how it sounds. If a spoken word is presented, it will have vivid phonological features 
and there is some chance that it will overwrite or erase the phonological features of the 
aforementioned printed word, making that word less active and recallable than it had been. The 
activated information is, in turn, a subset of all the information that is in the person’s long-term 
memory. New associations between items, such as those needed to keep in mind the trigram 
BLB, are formed in the focus of attention and are learned rapidly enough to be of immediate use. 
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This new learning of the sequence becomes a part of long-term memory that is still in an active 
state for a while after its initial learning, allowing repetition of the trigram if it is desired or use 
of that trigram in further thinking and processing. 
Competing Predictions Examined 
The most basic predictions that have been tested in our collaboration are related to what 
should occur when participants receive a storage-then-processing task with the difficulty of each 
task having been set separately to approximate the individual’s ability level and not exceeding 
that level. For example, in one of our joint experiments (Doherty et al., 2019), we asked 
participants in the single-task conditions to remember a short, random sequence of letters over an 
interval of 10 seconds, and then to try to recall the sequence. We also asked participants to carry 
out a series of simple arithmetic verifications (e.g., 5+6=9, True or False?), and to complete as 
many of these as possible in 10 seconds. Finally, participants were asked in the dual-task 
condition to remember a random letter sequence then to complete arithmetic verifications for 10 
seconds before recalling the letter sequence. The number of memory items in a list and number 
of arithmetic tasks in 10 seconds were set to where the participant was about 80% correct on 
these two tasks carried out separately. Theorists from each camp were asked to predict what the 
data would look like, based on their theories.  
Under these conditions, if we find that memory for the letters or accuracy on the arithmetic 
verification drops when the tasks are performed together compared with being performed 
separately, then this is referred to as a 'dual-task cost', that is, a 'cost' in performance when the 
two tasks are combined. The three theories differed regarding the conditions under which a dual-
task cost might or might not appear. As reported in Doherty et al. (2019), there was little to no 
change in performance on the arithmetic task whether participants were, or were not, asked to 
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remember a set of letters at the same time (i.e., little or no dual-task cost). This was consistent 
with the multi-component theory, which predicted that behaviors controlled by separate brain 
modules for memory and arithmetic would not interact. It was not consistent with embedded 
processes or time-based resources sharing theories, for which attention should have to be divided 
between memory and arithmetic. However, there was a decline in recall of the letter sequence 
when participants had to perform mental arithmetic in between seeing the letters and recalling 
them, compared with doing the memory task without interpolated arithmetic (i.e., a dual task 
cost). This was consistent with embedded processes and time-based resource sharing, but not 
with multi-component theory. So, no one theory predicted all of the data patterns, but each 
theory predicted some of the data obtained. 
We further attempted to distinguish between theories based on an extension of research to 
changes that may occur across the adult lifespan, ages 18-81 years (Rhodes et al., 2019). We 
screened individuals to exclude from the participant sample those with mild cognitive 
impairment or dementia. Here, not only did we compare performance on memory for letters 
alone and performance on mental arithmetic alone with both tasks when they were combined to 
form a storage-then-processing task; we also asked participants to prioritize one task or the other 
when performing them together, based on the number of points awarded for each task. In this 
instance, the time-based resource sharing theory predicted, as before, that there would be a dual-
task cost to performance, but this theory predicted that the dual-task cost and the ability to 
prioritize the tasks would be the same regardless of age. This was because the difficulty of each 
task, performed as a single task, was adjusted according to the ability of each participant, and 
this should cancel out individual and age differences in the ability to combine the memory and 
processing (arithmetic) tasks. The same was true of the multicomponent theory, based on 
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evidence that two tasks can be performed together with little or no drop in performance of either 
task at any adult age in the absence of dementia or other neuropathology (e.g., Kaschel, Logie, 
Kazén, & Della Sala, 2009), and that the dual task effect should not change according to whether 
one or other task was prioritized when performing them together (e.g., Logie, Cocchini, Della 
Sala, & Baddeley, 2004). The embedded-processes theory, on the other hand, predicted that letter 
memory and arithmetic were expected to interfere with one another when the two tasks were 
carried out on the same trial. Also, it was expected by this theory that the young adults would be 
better than older participants at adjusting the relative priorities to letter memory or to mental 
arithmetic. The results showed that both younger and older adults were equally good at 
prioritizing the two tasks, consistent with time-based resource sharing and the multi-component 
theory, but with increasing age, the size of the dual task cost increased, consistent only with 
embedded processes. In sum, once again there was no one theory that perfectly predicted the 
outcome of the experiment. 
From Doherty et al. (2019) and Rhodes et al. (2019) taken together, it seems clear that a 
successful theory of working memory will look a bit different from any of the three theories (or, 
indeed, any current theory) and might incorporate elements from all three theories. It is 
interesting that, for the young-adult study of Doherty et al., the predictions of the time-based 
resource sharing and embedded processes theories were most similar, whereas for the potential 
aging effects of Rhodes et al., the predictions of the multicomponent and time-based resource 
sharing theories were most similar. This realignment of theories from one situation to the other 
shows one potential benefit of having more than two theories to work with, which encourages 
subtle thinking about details of each theory rather than simpler oppositional thinking. Moreover, 
the experiments within this collaboration prompted the need to generate predictions in situations 
Adversarial Collaboration, Page 21 
 
not previously considered. For example, the time-based resource sharing and embedded process 
theories were adapted to make new predictions for adult aging. 
The challenges to each of the theories from these jointly generated data patterns are 
prompting the development of minor modifications to each theory that do not make the three 
views identical, but they do lead to more similar predictions. They also lead to additional 
questions for study, and we continue to pursue experimentation to distinguish between these 
theories or their reformulated versions, or perhaps to establish a compromise model that all can 
accept (see updated discussions in Logie, Camos, & Cowan, in press).  
Observed Limits and Benefits of Collaborating 
The conclusion that no current model is to be judged adequate based on these results is one 
reached by consensus in order to agree on a general discussion section for the paper. We suspect 
that, if these same results were collected by any one of our groups, that group’s discussion would 
be tilted much more in the favor of the group’s theory. We take this to be human nature; for 
various reasons, investigators do not easily abandon their favored theory. Even the design of the 
experiment, as well as the argument in favor of one theory, might be bolder in one group 
working alone, and the curtailing of bold arguments may be considered a drawback.  
Through the collaboration, however, there have been many distinct advantages, we think 
outweighing any disadvantages, especially because it is still possible for each group to carry out 
its own research. Advantages include but are not limited to the following. (1) In each experiment 
that we have conducted, we have managed to agree on an experimental design including many 
procedural details. Consequently, we claim that we all basically trust the results and can turn our 
attention to arguing about the theoretical interpretation and the best follow-up studies to be 
conducted. This situation is beneficial compared to the often-found situation in which proponents 
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of different theories advocate different methods. (2) In the attempt to account for each common 
data set on the basis of each theory, the theories probably must become more similar to one 
another, gradually as evidence accumulates. This gradual change in the theories does not depend 
upon voluntarily making them more similar, only upon efforts to account for common data, 
which theorists from opposing camps sometimes do not do. More usually, some key phenomena 
are accounted for on the basis of auxiliary types of evidence that can differ from one theory to 
another (e.g., a stronger focus on neuropsychology by multicomponent theories, versus 
neuroimaging by the embedded-processes theory). Instead, in our articles published in common, 
each theoretical camp often found itself struggling to account for data that it might actually have 
preferred to ignore. (3) Even though the contending theorists may not be able to agree, the 
collaboratively published research can serve as a forum that others in the field, not so committed 
to any particular view, might use to arrive at a more informed opinion based on what was found 
and what was claimed about it. 
 A more complete compendium of important points about the present, extended competing 
collaboration are shown in Table 1 and can be used to understand how, in the process of holding 
each other to high standards, we benefit from this collaboration. These are features that we 
recommend as important or helpful for any adversarial collaboration.  
 In sum, we feel that it is no small achievement to have succeeded fairly well in the 
agreement on findings in order to allow us the luxury of having a solid basis on which to mull 
over and debate theories. Carrying out agreed-upon research with methods and predictions pre-
registered cannot usually produce immediate theoretical converts, but it can achieve several 
things: (1) It can help to clear up misunderstandings about one another’s theories, and can help to 
point out to researchers inconsistencies or ambiguities in our own theories. This interaction can 
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lead to more carefully-stated, specific statements of each theory. (2) It can make the leading 
varieties of the opposing theories more like one another, at least in so far as is needed to account 
for the jointly-collected evidence. (3) It can force complications in the models that make some or 
all of them less elegant, reducing their magical appeal and turning attention more toward actual 
adequacy in a variety of situations. (4) It can serve as grounds to generate interesting ideas for 
new experiments that might be well-positioned to force further changes in the theories, in the 
process of trying to choose among them. Ideally, (5) it would result in a new theory that includes 
the most successful aspects of each theory. Although we do not believe that we have reached that 
point and do not know if that goal is realistic, it seems worth striving for. 
Further Thoughts about Collaboration in Hindsight  
Stasis and change of theoretical views.  Why does an investigator adopt a particular view, 
and what persuades her or him to change that view? An answer that works well for a simple 
hypothesis does not seem to work for an extensive theoretical framework, which may result from 
a lifetime of experience and investment in certain ideas. To illustrate this point in a second 
domain of inquiry, consider the issue of whether eye witnesses to a crime can display reliable, 
high-confidence answers in a police lineup (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Without going into detail, 
we would note that the situation of a police lineup can vary in terms of what the witness is told in 
advance, how the suspects are presented (one at a time or all at once), who the non-suspected 
volunteers added to the lineup are (e.g., people similar to the suspect or not), and other factors. 
Let us refer to some hypothetical conditions of the lineup as Situations A through E that are 
ordered from most to least supportive of accurate memory. Suppose that an investigator has a 
theoretical view in which eye witnesses are rarely reliable. When a prediction must be made, the 
investigator may predict that adequate reliability should occur in Situations A and B but not C, D 
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or E. A finding that there is, actually, reliable judgment in Situation C clearly contradicts one of 
the investigator’s hypotheses. This contradiction alone, however, would not necessarily change 
the investigator’s theoretical point of view fundamentally; with a little fine-tuning, its main 
premises might survive, altered slightly to predict that reliable memory should occur in 
Situations A, B, and C, but not D or E. For example, Conditions B and C might differ only on 
how many people are included in the lineup, and the theorist might be able to change the theory 
to allow a more efficient use of memory to consider all of the suspects in the lineup. The 
investigator may wish to preserve the theory with the minimal change because it seems 
consistent with many other ideas that that investigator strongly supports, or findings upon which 
the investigator often dwells. It seems fine for each investigator to try to preserve their favorite 
theory (provided that the process does not become degenerative in the sense of Lakatos 1968-
1969, mentioned earlier), inasmuch as the process of seeing how far each theory can or cannot go 
advances the field and allows better comparisons of theories by readers and listeners to the 
theorists presenting findings together within a competing collaboration.  
Settling large issues. We suspect that the issue of the difficulty of deciding among 
theoretical frameworks is much broader than our own area, and afflicts most scientific endeavors 
(cf. Lakatos, 1968-1969; Newell, 1973). Part of this diversity of opinions could be a 
disagreement about actual facts, given conflicting findings. In our area, for example, no 
agreement has emerged on the best theory of working memory, or even on the best definition of 
it (Cowan, 2017), despite almost 50 years of experimentation on this topic in the field of 
cognitive psychology and the pertinence of working memory to very diverse cognitive tasks 
(e.g., see Baddeley, 2007; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 2005/2016; Logie, 1995, 2016; 
Logie, Camos, & Cowan, in press). However, in our area, as noted earlier, progress has been 
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made by establishing an extensive set of findings upon which many investigators do seem to 
agree (Oberauer et al., 2018; but see Logie, 2018; Vandierendonck, 2018).  
By analogy, is your theory of Person A that she is basically a good person or bad? If good, 
suppose that person does something bad. You could switch your theory, or you could suppose 
that this good person was just having a bad day. Similarly, in our own area of research described 
earlier, multicomponent theorists can suppose that ideal conditions were not achieved for 
observing the fundamental absence of dual-task costs when verbal memory is combined with 
nonverbal processing within a storage-then-processing task, or the time-based resource sharing 
or embedded-processes theorists can suppose that conditions were not ideal to observe dual-task 
costs in both memory and processing in this situation. More varied and extensive observation is 
needed to support or disconfirm a theoretical view.  
To understand how science might move forward beyond the individual experiment, it helps 
to adopt a view proposed by Kuhn (1962) and further developed by Lakatos (1968-1969, 1978). 
In this view, a theoretical stance is unlikely to be overturned by the results of a single, crucial 
experiment. Instead, the investigator brings to the scientific endeavor a worldview based on a 
large number of formative experiences and fundamental beliefs and biases, which resist change. 
The view can evolve slowly, but usually does not change radically except after considerable, 
varied evidence has accumulated. When two investigators with very different worldviews see the 
same evidence, they can have different favored interpretations, and it is often not an easy matter 
to discern whose worldview is most appropriate to account for all of the available evidence.  
In our own adversarial collaboration with preregistration of methods, predictions, and 
analysis plans, based on three different theoretical views in three countries carrying out research 
together for several years, we hope that we can get beyond agreement on the results. We aspire 
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to reach a point at which our theoretical views will at least begin to shift toward one another as 
the corpus of jointly-obtained findings and publications increases. A new view could result. 
Lessons for Best Scientific Practices 
Maintaining a Useful and Practical Attitude Toward Collaboration 
Provided that we can continue to come up with test situations that differentiate our views, 
we endorse the suggestion (Lakatos, 1968-1969, 1978) that a progressive and feasible option is 
to build on and modify existing theories, based heavily on past evidence, to incorporate data 
patterns that the theories cannot currently explain. In the field of cognitive psychology, Newell 
(1973) wrote that “you can’t play 20 questions with nature and win,” and the concern he had then 
still rings true. He meant that progress in cognitive psychology cannot be made by examining 
separately various basic, binary oppositions, like the existence of capacity limits or not, the 
existence of decay or not, or parallel versus serial processing (or, we would add, the conditions 
in which dual-task costs are found). He lamented that years of such testing did not add up to a 
coherent model of how participants operate on a variety of tasks. If Newell’s concern were not 
on target, we would have agreed-upon answers to the questions by the time of this writing, nearly 
a half-century later. 
Newell’s suggested solution to the problem was a comprehensive, computational or 
computer model of the entire information storage and processing system, so that theoretical 
models of various tasks could help constrain one another. It is possible to construct such holistic 
systems, but computer-based models still produce multiple, alternative solutions (e.g., Anderson, 
1983; Laird, 2012; Newell, 1990; Taatgen & Anderson, 2008) based on different fundamental 
assumptions. We are proposing a somewhat different scientific process in which the emphasis is 
on forcing the modification of general, opposing theories held by different investigators through 
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joint data collection, inevitably making those theories more like one another if they are to 
account for the new data along with the old. Given that the effort appears to be succeeding, it 
seems premature to invest the time it would take to formalize each theory computationally. We 
are able to make progress despite the fact that individual investigators tend not to abandon their 
general theoretical views formed over a lifetime.  
Treating Theoretical Views Carefully  
 When individuals in a close working relationship argue or debate one another, they 
hopefully realize that their task is not only to reach a common understanding of what was said, 
but also of what was intended, as this may not be exactly the same. There are several important 
sub-goals toward reaching an understanding of one another’s theories. (1) The first is to try to 
look beyond what is said, toward what may be meant. That initial burden falls on the one trying 
to comprehend someone else’s theory. (2) Following questions and clarifications, a second 
important goal, falling on the one trying to express a theoretical view, is to state that view more 
clearly so that what is literally said will line up better with what is intended. (3) In the process of 
query and clarification, not only what is said but also what is intended may subtly change, given 
the discussion of the ideas in a way that is hopefully constructive rather than destructive. 
A possible example comes from our own adversarial collaboration. Logie (2016), as a 
multicomponent theorist, has suggested that the central executive should be retired, given that it 
implies an homunculus (little person inside the head, making decisions for us) in control of 
cognition, and the argument that essentially it offers a label for complex aspects of cognition that 
we have yet to understand (Baddeley, 1996), but now are beginning to understand (and for a 
similar view, see Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Eisenreich, Akaishi, & Hayden, 2017;  
Vandierendonck, 2016; Willshaw, 2006). Rather than simply rejecting that view, it is important 
Adversarial Collaboration, Page 28 
 
for opposing theorists to query what was meant by it. Does it mean that there is no such thing as 
mental effort? One might assume so, but some of us heard Logie give a public lecture in which 
he used the terms “mental effort” and “work harder” to describe some working-memory 
phenomena in real life to non-specialists. From the multicomponent perspective, the implication 
is that autonomously-operating brain modules working co-operatively yield the illusion of self-
control, a description with which, on some level, most psychologists can agree. The embedded-
processes view discusses the central executive as a voluntary decider or deliberator but, as noted 
at the close of Cowan (1995, p. 274), the decision process still must emerge in a determinate way 
from the laws of physics, chemistry, and neurology, and the central executive concept represents 
these processes until more is known. The decisions participants make using their central 
executive processes can be said to be voluntary, in that they can change according to 
experimental instructions or pre-stated motivations. It is not clear whether we disagree on this 
issue and in the future, the central executive or whatever replaces it is one example of a concept 
that must be explained quite cautiously inasmuch as misunderstandings of views on this topic 
seem likely.  
Even when theorists do not agree with one another at all, they may find rhetorical or 
conceptual use for one another’s theories. Consider the persistent usefulness of the “modal 
model” of memory, a term that appears to have been devised by Murdock (1967) to describe a 
tripartite memory system with a sensory store with information that decays, leading to a primary 
memory with a small amount of information that can be displaced, and leading from there to a 
long-term memory with a lifetime of information that suffers interference at the time when 
information is retrieved from it (cf. Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). We suspect that many of the 
theorists who reject such a model (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, Hitch, & Allen, 
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2019; Logie, 1995) nevertheless present the general idea of the three-part system in an attempt to 
explain memory to introductory psychology students with minimal confusion. [In doing so, the 
sequential relationship between the three parts may be altered from Atkinson and Shiffrin: both 
Logie (1995) and Cowan (1988) would describe the flow of information as sensory input to long-
term memory before activated long-term information could be entered into working memory 
(Logie) or into the focus of attention (Cowan)]. Similarly, in physics, relativity theorists and 
quantum theorists might usefully present Newton’s theory of gravity as an understandable 
approximation to the truth. As Newton built on theories from Descartes, so Einstein built on 
Newton’s theories, and Stephen Hawking built on Einstein’s ideas. If a non-subscriber to a 
theory finds it useful in communication, perhaps theorists can understand each others’ theories as 
being valid within a certain domain (cf. Mellers et al., 2001), and perhaps even take their own 
theories with a grain of salt, acknowledging how much of the theory has yet to be filled in, 
clarified, or modified.  
Finding Possible Limits and Extensions of Adversarial Collaboration 
 Researchers have to have some assumptions in common to motivate an adversarial 
collaboration. For example, in our collaboration, all three theoretical camps have operated 
primarily with verbal and graphical statements of theory (Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Logie, 
1995, 2003, 2016; Cowan, 1988, 1995, 1999) and with the use of simple mathematics as tools of 
measurement (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Cowan, Blume, & Saults, 2013, appendices; Rhodes, Cowan, 
Hardman, & Logie, 2017; Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan, 2011) or to express simple laws of 
behavior (e.g., Barrouillet, Portrat & Camos, 2011). This approach is at odds with researchers 
who believe that theories are valuable only to the extent that they are stated in complete 
mathematical form to allow quantitative predictions, even when this means specifying some 
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parameters arbitrarily (e.g., Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011). Could an adversarial 
collaboration include both qualitative and quantitative modelers? Probably so but with the 
impediment that it is difficult to compare a theory for which evaluation is based on a qualitative 
pattern of differences between conditions with a theory for which it is based on quantitative 
model fit statistics. As another example, it is difficult to compare a theory of the mind with a 
theory of brain function, and so some differences between theories may reflect different levels of 
explanation rather than genuine theoretical conflict. 
 Nevertheless, we could imagine quite exciting collaborations between these types of 
theorists. A quantitative theorist can make statements that constrain more qualitative theorists, 
such as: I cannot find a reasonable way to obtain your pattern of results without some sort of 
central executive; I cannot get verbal rehearsal to work correctly to produce typical results (cf. 
Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2015); Your theories sound different but produce the same results; or 
What plausible processes are needed to make a capacity-based theory of verbal working-memory 
account for probe recognition results? (cf. Cowan, Rouder, Blume, & Saults, 2012).  
One could imagine an adversarial collaboration with, say, four theoretical camps involving 
two theoretical positions (e.g., multi-modular versus unified working memory storage) crossed 
with two methodological positions (e.g., primarily qualitative versus heavily invested in 
quantitative modeling). It would produce alliances between theoretical Positions 1 and 2 and 
different alliances between methodological Positions A and B, potentially to an effect that is 
quite innovative. In another example, the 2 x 2 grid of views could include theories of working 
memory crossed with behavioral versus neuroscientific methods.  
Recommendations  
 A reviewer of a prior draft of this article asked for several specific recommendations, and 
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we agree on the need for them. We briefly answer the reviewer’s questions here with reference to 
many related points already discussed above and entered into Table 1.  
How should partners for collaboration be chosen? We believe that the laboratories that 
collaborate must be willing to come in good faith, with the possibility of compromise, at least to 
the point of agreeing on a method to use together; but with no agreement needed on the 
anticipated outcome or the interpretation of every possible finding. It is most likely that one or 
even several experiments cannot resolve the differences to every side’s satisfaction, so the 
investigators should be willing to advance the field without becoming too frustrated that a larger 
reconciliation between views cannot be reached; the collaborators must be patient, and must try 
to be realistic. It is also helpful if one chooses collaborators who express their views precisely 
enough that their expectations are clear, although it seems fine for some points of view to make 
no prediction on some part of the experimental outcomes (unlike the method we have used).  
Of course, not all scientific disagreements are right for collaboration; if the sides disagree 
too vociferously and emotionally then it may be impossible for collaborators to work together 
effectively. This level of emotionality might be an impediment, for example, in debates about 
whether restored memories of childhood abuse commonly occur, or about whether a nativist 
view of language is appropriate. These are great areas for adversarial collaboration, but only if 
the investigators find that they are able to work together effectively. There have been some 
breakthroughs of agreement, such as agreement between two investigators with different views 
regarding police lineups; they reached an agreement on what lineup conditions allow accurate, 
confident identifications of the correct suspects, though most likely not on all predictions and 
theoretical points (Wixted & Wells, 2017).  
How many laboratories should collaborate? Our experience tells us that in-person 
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meetings are important and that each side will need considerable time to express their views and 
enter into discussions. We therefore recommend two to four laboratories, perhaps more than 
coincidentally similar to the suggested core limit in working memory capacity (Cowan, 2001). 
 How does the process of experimental design work? The aim should be to test the most 
fundamental disagreement between views in a way that extracts maximally dissimilar predictions 
from the different views. The key is reaching an agreement about what design is acceptable to 
test these different views. It is possible that some potential collaborations will end before an 
agreed-upon design can be found. However, to prevent that unfortunate outcome, it greatly helps 
to have funding for experts such as postdoctoral fellows whose main focus is carrying out 
experiments for the collaboration. In-person and remote electronic meetings and regular 
communication are essential to ensure a joint commitment to complete the project successfully. 
Journal editors can facilitate this kind of collaboration by being willing to review the methods 
before data are collected, offering either in-principle acceptance (contingent on faithful execution 
of the stated design) or comments regarding how the design is perceived by reviewers.  
Depending on the theories, it may not always be possible to come up with a perfect 
experimental design. For example, in comparing two theories, it would be perfect if some Effect 
A (like our dual-task costs) were predicted by Theory 1 but not Theory 2 (or better yet, if Theory 
2 predicted an effect in the opposite direction), whereas some Effect B (which we have not 
found) were predicted by Theory 2 but not Theory 1. In the absence of this kind of dissociation 
of theories by two effects, Bayesian statistics can be used to argue for the null hypothesis 
predicted by a theory, as mentioned earlier.  
What mistakes tend to occur, and how can they be avoided? One grave mistake would 
be to forge ahead with research without preregistration of predictions, methods, and planned 
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analyses, or without general data sharing between laboratories, in which case it would be likely 
that at least one group would tend to perceive shifting postdictions or lack of transparency. We 
did not make that mistake, but perhaps we should have openly discussed the ground rules for 
predictions. These often had to be made under considerable time pressure and the procedure was 
set up such that groups were forced to make explicit predictions to the point that it was 
sometimes not possible to document which were the key predictions of an approach and which 
were filled-in predictions that were not based on strong commitment of the theory. It would also 
be a mistake to underestimate the importance of including some collaborators who are not fully 
committed to any of the views, as they can tend to serve as arbiters when there is an impasse (a 
function served by the first author of Mellers et al., 2001). In our collaboration, postdoctoral 
fellows served this function, as they tended to be less committed to any one view than were 
senior investigators. Finally, it could be a mistake to adhere too severely to the preregistered 
analyses. These definitely should be carried out and considered carefully but, after that, if it is 
found that these analyses do not completely distinguish between theories, we feel it is perfectly 
acceptable to carry out additional, post-hoc analyses provided that the post-hoc nature is made 
clear. 
What happens when the different laboratories disagree on the interpretation of 
results? We have tended to report all of the alternative interpretations in our joint publications 
and have used these conflicting interpretations to help steer additional research needed to resolve 
the issues (as did Mellers et al., 2001). In the end, although the differences are not yet resolved 
by reaching a mutually palatable theory, we have provided important evidence to the field for 
others to judge what theoretical views work best and have established some grounds on which 
mutually acceptable data can be collected. As this article demonstrates, we have gained valuable 
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experience in the process of working together.  
We urge investigators to try out such adversarial collaborations and, as they do, to take 
careful note of what is working and what is not, and how the theoretical views are evolving. In 
place of continually perpetuating debates that are never resolved, adversarial collaborations, and 
reports on how they perhaps become less adversarial or less chaotic over time, could advance our 
means of accelerating scientific progress.  
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Table 1 
Important and Helpful Characteristics of the Present Adversarial Collaboration 
Characteristic Importance 
  
Three theoretical views 
represented 
Goes beyond binary decisions. Possibility of Views A, B 
aligned on some issues but B, C aligned on other issues. 
Three laboratories reflecting 
the different theoretical views 
Possibility of replicating and comparing effects across 
laboratories representing different theoretical views. 
Concurrent replication of each 
study in two laboratories 
Allows a comparison of the same method and analyses across 
laboratories coming from different theoretical orientations. 
Definition of terms in 
discussions (e.g., working 
memory; small effect size) 
Different theoretical views often come with different implied 
definitions of terms, and this must be made explicit in order to 
determine when views conflict and adjudicate between them. 
Listening for meaning Important to go beyond what investigators say to understand 
what they are trying to say, given different vocabulary usage. 
Reformulation of theories 
after listening for meaning 
Important to use the feedback to articulate each theory more 
precisely, for better understanding and communication. 
Common methodology 
(cognitive behavioral testing; 
verbal and graphic theory) 
Possible to discuss specific issues and plan joint experiments 
without getting bogged down in discussions about what 
methodology is legitimate. 
Preregistered methods, 
predictions, analysis plans  
Make it difficult to overlook the fact that the results do not 
match the predictions, when that occurs. 
Bayesian inferential statistics Possible to find support both for and against a hypothesis, 
always important but especially so when some theoretical 
views predict null effects.    
Funding for research with 
excellent postdoctoral fellows 
across several years 
Incorporation of new methods not always familiar to senior 
researchers; early career colleagues who are not as committed 
to one view; fair amount of consistency in personnel over 
years. Financial support for regular meetings, exchange visits, 
and joint commitment to complete the planned research 
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program so to be accountable to the funding agency.  
Pre-existing working 
relationships between the 
senior investigators (e.g., 
Logie & Cowan, 2015) 
Less risk in trying to work together despite differences in 
opinion, given that this work has tended to succeed and come 
to completion in the past. It is also helpful if the investigators 
can socialize and not take professional disagreements 
personally. 
Extended visits of 
postdoctoral fellows between 
laboratories 
Cross-fertilization of different methodology and theory, 
helping to bridge the gaps between laboratories. Enhances 
post-doctoral experience for career development.  
In-person and electronic 
meetings with all 
collaborators 
Frequent discussion of the issues that are most important in a 
timely manner to inform and guide the research. 
Postdoctoral senior authorship 
on most of the articles  
Sets up the adversarial collaboration as a high priority among 
collaborators while advancing everyone’s career. 
Incorporation of multiple 
situations (e.g., aging research 
along with research on young 
adults in our work) 
Can add a dimension on which the theories have not 
previously been compared, and can make it likely that the 
outcome of the work will be of practical, in addition to 
theoretical, value. 
Researchers encouraged to 
propose ways they could 
explain new results from their 
respective theoretical 
viewpoints   
Provides a path beyond the usual arguments about whose 
theoretical viewpoint is more appropriate, toward a situation 
in which each theoretical orientation can evolve, given new 
evidence. Ideally, the theoretical views are drawn closer 
together in a way that works for the investigators. 
 
